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Abstract 
Searching for a (new) job or searching for a new employee takes time. In 
the search or recruitment process the use of search/recruitment methods 
is extremely important. We distinguish four search/recruitment methods: 
advertisements, public employment office, inforaal channels and a rest 
category 'other'. In this paper we analyse the efficiency of the search-
/recruitment methods; i.e. the speed at which potential contacts in the 
market result in a match. We also analyse the effect of the total number 
of vacancies and job seekers on the number of matches. Therefore we deve-
lop a model to estimate matching functions using both micro data on 
vacancy and search duration combined with data on supply and demand in 
the market. 
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1. Introduction 
This paper aims to analyse the effectiveness of different search and 
recruitment channels used by workers and employers. In our model the 
success of the use of a search/recruitment channel depends on the effi-
ciency of a channel, i,e, the speed at which potential contacts result 
in a match, and on the total number of jobseekers and vacancies that 
use the channel. 
Generally the effectiveness of search/recruitment channels is assessed 
along two different ways. First, by the number of job offers for workers 
and the pool of applicants for employers that are generated when these 
channels are used. Secondly, the effectiveness of a search/recruitment 
channel is measured by the time it takes to find a new job or a new em-
ployee. Gontributions regarding the success of the use of search methods 
can be found in e.g. Holzer (1987, 1988) and Blau and Robins (1990) for 
worker's search and Roper (1988) for employer's search. In these contri-
butions four different search or recruitment channels are distinguished: 
advertisements, employment office, informal search and other. 
With regard to workers' search Holzer (1987,1988) found informal 
search, using friends and relatives, to be the most productive in terms 
of the number of j ob offers and accepted j obs. This is confirmed by filau 
and Robins (1990), who also find that employed job seekers experience a 
higher probability of finding a job than unemployed job seekers. Blaschke 
(1987) using German data, also found the informal search channel to be 
the most productive, whereas Jones (1989) found no significant differ-
ences. Roper (1988), conducting an analysis for employer's search dura-
tion, concluded that informal search is also the most productive channel 
for firms (in terms of expected duration). 
There are some drawbacks in these earlier studies. First, they are 
partial in the sense that worker's search and employer's search are ana-
lysed separately. Second, the total number of workers and employers 
operating through a specific search or recruitment channel is ignored. 
It is obvious that if the number of workers on the market, searching 
through a specific channel, is large relatively to the number of vacan-
cies at that market, long 'search' durations for workers and short vacan-
cy durations are expected. In general the effectiveness of a specific 
search or recruitment channel depends on the size of the pool of appli-
cants and vacancies at the market level. 
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We estimate a general model that allows for both sides of the labor 
market to interact, and that takes account of their relative numbers. 
For each separate search/recruitment channel we specify a matching func-
tion. The number of matches per channel depends on the number of vacan-
cies and the number of job seekers coming to the market through that 
channel. The parameters of the matching function are an efficiency para-
meter and scale parameters (or 'geometrie weights') indicating the 
relative importance of supply and demand. The effectiveness of a specific 
search/recruitment channel can be assessed on the basis of the estimated 
parameters. 
We explicitly allow the parameters to differ for employed and unem-
ployed workers. For example, it is not a priori clear that inf ormal 
search will be as effective for unemployed workers as it is for employed; 
the former may loose their informal contacts as time goes on. 
From the matching functions defined at the market level, we derive 
micro economie duration models for employers and workers. In the speci-
fication of the hazard, the same parameters of the matching function 
appear. At the micro level, every time a worker finds a new job we have 
a match. The same holds when a vacancy is filled. Both processes are 
governed by the same matching function. Our approach allows us to analyse 
micro economie data on vacancy and job search duration simultaneously. 
To establish the effect of the total number of vacancies and the total 
number of workers on the effectiveness of the different search/recruit-
ment channels we combine the micro data with data at the market level. 
The results indicate large differences between the effectiveness of 
the search channels. Also within a given specific search channel large 
differences exist between employed and unemployed workers. Advertisements 
and informal search are most effective in matching employed workers and 
vacancies, but the employment office is very ineffective. The employment 
office is on the other hand very effective in matching unemployed workers 
and vacancies. In this case advertisements are very ineffective. 
The plan of the paper is as follows. We present the model in section 
2. In section 3 we discuss the data. In section 4 we present the empi-
rical specification and the results. Section 5 briefly comments on the 
estimation procedure. Section 6 concludes. 
2. The model 
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Taking our lead from previous empirical work (e.g. Holzer (1987,-
1988)), we distinguish four different search/recruitment channels that 
employers (vacancies) and workers (jobseekers) use to meet each other: 
advertisements, informal search, public employment office and other . 
The number of matches (or the flow of filled job vacancies c.q. the flow 
of job seekers finding a job) through each channel depends on the number 
of job seekers and vacancies using the channel, as well as on the speed 
at which each potential contact between jobseeker and vacancy is trans-
lated into a formal match. Following the literature we refer to the 
latter as the efficiency of the search channels. The total effect on 
the number of matches of the number of vacancies and jobseekers combined 
with the efficiency of the search channel is referred to as the ef-
fect iveness of the channel. 
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Figure 1. Search of employers and workers 
The number of vacancies and job seekers differ over job types. We expect 
that employers will use recruitment channels in different proportions for 
different job types. When they want to fill a vacancy requiring a high 
level of education they might prefer using advertisements to using the 
1. For workers (employers) informal search methods include checking friends/relatives 
(friends/relatives/own personnel) or inquiring for work by an employer (recruiting those 
who inquired). Other search methods is a collection of remaining categories. 
public employment office. Different job seekers might also want to use 
different search channels. The effectiveness of a specific search method 
generally depends on the type of job. Informal search for example may be 
efficiënt for construction workers, but may be ineffective for admini-
strative workers. Figure 1 gives a graphic illustration of our view of 
the market per job type. 
For each submarket, characterised by job type i and search channel 
j , the pool of job seekers is generated by the search process at the 
individual level. Each worker decides whether or not to search and if 
so, which search method(s) to use. The same holds for the employer. 
Aggregation gives the pool of job seekers and vacancies at the market 
level. Of course the decisions what search/recruitment channel to use 
is based on the expected success using the channel. These decisions are 
not explicitly modelled in this paper. 
In each of the four submarkets characterised by search channel j a 
potential contact may or may not end in an actual match. The number of 
contacts per time period depends on the average time between contacts and 
on the number of job seekers and vacancies. More formally, we specify 
for each submarket, characterised by search channel j and job type i: 
C - N..aJ V./j/r,. (1) 
ij iJ ij iJ 
C . equals the number of contacts in a period of time, [t,t+dt>, N.. the 
number of job seekers at time t, V.. the number of vacancies at time t, 
and T.. the average time between two contacts. The parameters OJ and £j 
are weights assigned to the number of job seekers (N..) and the number 
of vacancies (V..) in the market, indicating the relative importance of 
N.. and V... An extremely tight labour market corresponds to the case 
aj-O, £j**0: i.e. the number of job seekers play no role in the matching 
process. We assume that the effects of the total number of job seekers 
(aj) and of the total number of vacancies (/3j) are the same for all job 
categories. Given a contact between jobseeker and vacancy (employer), the 
flow of filled vacancies (F^^) in a short time period, or equivalently 
the flow of job seekers finding a (new) job, equals the number of con-
tacts multiplied by the probability that a contact turns into a match 
( P c ) : 
ij 
F.. - (N, .ai V. A / T , , } . P c , ij ij J ij y ij ij (2) 
Define A.. as Pc../T. . The parameter A. . may be interpreted as an 
efficiency parameter indicating the speed at which, conditional on the 
number of job seekers and vacancies, potential contacts result in a m-
atch . We use the parameter A.. to obtain: 
F.. = A., N..0^ V . A (3) 
ij ij ij J ij J 
Equation (3) is the familiar Cobb-Douglas specification of the matching 
function. Examples of previous empirical studies using aggregate time 
series are Blanchard and Diamond (1989), Jackman, Layard and Pissarides 
(1989) and Van Ours (1991). Following Diamond (1982), Blanchard and Dia-
mond (1989) we allow for the possibility of increasing returns to scale. 
As Blanchard and Diamond argue, 'Active "thick" markets may lead to eas-
ier matches, with or without more intensive search.' We will return to 
this point when we discuss the estimation results. In contrast to the 
previous studies we specify for each search channel j and job type i, a 
separate matching function. 
Estimation of (3) is not possible since that would require data at 
the market level on the flow of filled vacancies in a certain time peri-
od, the number of job seekers and the number of vacancies at the begin-
ning of the period, each stratified according to type of job as well as 
to search channel (F.., N. . and V..). In the Netherlands, and presumably 
in most other countries, these stratified data are not available. 
Empirical implementation 
In this section we develop an empirical model based on the matching 
function (3) . We show that micro data on vacancy and search durations can 
be combined with aggregated data on the total number of job seekers of 
type i (N.) and the total number of vacancies of type i (V.) in order 
to estimate the parameters of the matching function (3). 
2. In a steady state situation we may «rite the expected vacancy duration tv as V/F 
and the expected search duration for jobseekers ts as N/F. Assume that at-/3-=l, then we have 
that: 
C* 1-OJ 
A-i/{ ts tv }. 
This i s the inverse geometrie average of expected vacancy duration and expected job search 
duration. 
Data on V. are available in The Netherlands. Data on the total number 
of job seekers can be constructed in the following way. There are data 
available on the number of unemployed job seekers categorized by job 
type. Also there are data available on the total number of people employ-
ed on job type i. Of the latter category we have to determine who is 
looking for a job. Micro data on the search behaviour of employed people 
enable us to predict the probability that someone working in job type i 
searches for a job. Combining this probability with the total number of 
workers employed on job type i gives us the total number of employed 
job seekers. Note that we implicitly assume that workers are looking 
for a job of the same type. 
Given aggregated data on N. and V. , we have to determine which frac-
tion is assigned to advertisement, informal search, employment office and 
other search methods. These are constructed as follows. 
At a specific point in time, say tg, we define q.. as the probability 
that a randomly selected vacancy of type i is from submarket j, j-l,..,4. 
Furthermore define p.. as the probability that a randomly selected worker 
of type i is searching through channel j, j-l,..,4. Then, if V. is the 
total number of vacancies in the population at time tg, we have that 
V..=q...V.. Analogously, given the total number of workers N. at time 
tQ, we have that N..-p...N.. So the pool of vacancies and searchers per 
job type, using search channel j, can be obtained from aggregated data 
on V., N. and the probabilities q.« and p... 
Furthermore, given the pool of vacancies V. . , the flow of filled va-
cancies per time period [t,t+dt>, can be obtained using the instantaneous 
rate of leaving this pool. It is obvious that the total number of vacan-
cies form the risk set to turn into matches. Hence as a natural interpre-
tation we have the hazard rate for the durations of vacancies (0..v) as 
ij 
a simple ratio of F., to V , Analogously, the hazard rate for the search 
duration (8. . s) follows from the definition of F., and the pool of sear-
iJ ij F 
chers N... 
ij 
In sum, we have for each j the following relations: 
F..«A..N.,aJV..^J (3') 
ij IJ ij IJ 
V..-q., V. (4) 
ij ij i 
N,.-p..N. 
ij IJ i (5) 
F . . - 0 . . v V . . (6) 
IJ IJ IJ 
F . . - 0 . . s V . , (7) 
i j IJ i j 
Using equa t i on (6) we r e w r i t e equa t ion ( 3 ' ) a s : 
0 . . v = A.. N . . a J V . . ^ " 1 (8a) 
i j IJ IJ IJ 
And using equation (7): 
0..s= A.. N.. "J"1 V./J (8b) 
ij IJ ij IJ 
Reformulating the macro matching function we derive a micro economie 
model in which the hazard rates are a function of N.. and V.., and where 
ij iJ 
A.., aj and /3j are the parameters of interest. Even in the absence of ma-
cro data on N.., V.. and F., the parameters of the macro matching func-
tion, equation (3), can be obtained using micro data from workers' and/or 
employers' surveys combined with aggregate data on N. and V.. 
Our estimation procedure consists of two steps. First, from micro 
data on the use of search/recruitment methods we determine the probabi-
lities q.. and p.. using simple probit analyses. In combination with 
aggregated data on N. and V., we use the predicted probabilities to 
obtain N.. and V.., j-l,..,4. In the second stage, using data on search 
and vacancy duration, the parameters of the matching function, A.., o-? 
ij J 
and /9j , are estimated. 
The probabilities q.. and p.. are determined from analyses on the 
use of search methods by employers and workers. This is an interesting 
intermediate result of the above sketched estimation procedure. Contri-
butions to the use of search methods are not plentiful. Exceptions are 
Holzer (1987, 1988), Blaschke (1987), Jones (1989) and Blau and Robbins 
(1990) for workers' search, and Roper (1988), Van Ours (1989) and Van 
Ours and Ridder (1992) for employers' search. 
Note that in our analysis simultaneous relationships between the use 
of search or recruitment channels and the probability of success are ru-
led out^. The probabilities q.. and p.. are estimated using reduced form 
3. Implementation of the estimated q and p in equation (8) or (8') wou ld be trou-
blesome if for example the probability of success is included in the set of regressors 
for q or p 
ij ij 
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equations. We briefly discuss the intermediate results on the use of 
search and recruitment channels in section 3.3. 
3. Data 
In order to estimate our model we need micro data on the use of search 
and recruitment channels, duration of search, vacancy duration, and ag-
gregated data on the number of vacancies (V.) and the number of workers 
(N.). Aggregated data on N. and V. are obtained from the Manpower Survey 
('Arbeidskrachtentelling' (AKT)) and the Vacancy Survey of the Nether-
lands Central Bureau of Statistics (CBS) . Micro data on the use of search 
and recruitment channels, vacancy duration and the duration of search 
are obtained from two different panel surveys conducted by the Organisa-
tion for Labour Market Research (OSA). 
3.1 Data on vacancies: the OSA job vacancy survey 
In this survey the employer is asked whether he has vacancies for 
which he is searching employees whom he wants to put to work immediate-
ly or as soon as possible. This implies that vacancies are not restricted 
to unoccupied jobs. The employers' sample is drawn from the database of 
the Dutch Chambers of Commerce, from which government and education as 
well as temporary help agencies are excluded. The sample is stratified 
according to firm size and industry. In the original sample 1288 medium 
sized (> 10 employees) and 625 large (> 100 employees) employers were 
included. 
The job vacancy survey was held in two stages. In the first wave, 
held in the period November 1986 to January 1987, firms were asked whe-
ther they had vacancies. 648 employers (out of 1913) had vacancies; 580 
firms agreed to participate in the panel survey. The employers were asked 
about the skills they require for their job vacancies, the sort of jobs 
the vacancies referred to, their search methods and selection procedures, 
the number of applicants, the elapsed duration of the job vacancies, the 
characteristics of the hard-to-fill job vacancies and the chances long-
term unemployed would have if they would apply. Employers were also asked 
whether they had single or multiple vacancies. By the latter we mean a 
job vacancy for which the employer is searching more than one applicant 
with the same required skills. 
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550 employers (out of 580) participated In the second wave, held 
approximately four months later. The employers were asked whether the job 
vacancies registered in the first wave had been filled, and if so, at 
what time. Also the characteristics of the new employee were denoted. 
Discarding incomplete and unreliable observations a sample of 1189 
job vacancies remains. 
3.2 Data on employed and unemployed job seekers: the OSA laboxxr force 
panel survey 
We use data on individuals from the second and the third wave of the 
OSA labour force panel. The second wave held in October 1986, has 4115 
respondents between 15 and 61 years at the time of the first interview 
(April 1985) who were not attending full time education. In the second 
wave we selected all employed and unemployed respondents and obtained 
information on elapsed job search durations and personal and labour 
market characteristics. Using information from the third wave (held in 
september 1988) we established the job search duration. 
It should be noted that the OSA labour force panel survey is subject 
to a substantial attrition rate (approximately 30% in each wave) . The 
effect of the attrition rate however, is found to be negligible (see Van 
den Berg, Lindeboom and Ridder (1991)). 
Af ter discarding incomplete and/or inconsistent observations 2442 
employed and 212 unemployed workers remained in our sample. Of the em-
ployed workers 335 were looking for a new job. A person was considered 
to be unemployed if he or she was not working and reported to be acti-
vely seeking for a job, irrespective of the registration at the public 
employment office. 
3.3 Constructing stratified data on N. . and V. . 
6
 ij J-J 
The Vacancy Survey of the Central Bureau of Statistics (1986) provided 
us with the total number of vacancies stratified by job type. From the 
Manpower Survey 1985 of the Central Bureau of Statistics we have aggrega-
ted data on the number of unemployed job seekers per job type and the 
number of employed per job type i. In this section we have a closer look 
at the demand/supply ratio (V./N.) over the search/recruitment channels. 
Table 1 gives a first impression of the use of search channels by employ-
ers and workers. 
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Tab Ie 1 The use of search channels by employers and workers 
Employers Empl. workers Unempl. workers 
Advertisement 66Z 85% 78Z 
Informal 63Z 29Z 50Z 
Empl. office 44Z 12% 52Z 
Others 33Z 33Z 27Z 
Average number 
of channels 2.1 1.8 2.8 
Advertisement appears to be the most frequently used search channel 
for both workers and employers. Employed workers use informal search 
channels and the employment office less frequent than advertisement. 
The average number of search channels used by employers and employed 
workers is about two; unemployed workers use approximately three diffe-
rent search channels. 
Next, to obtain estimates on the 'weights' p.. and q.., we perform 
•LJ IJ 
probit analyses on the use of search methods by employers and workers. 
The estimation results for employers are given in Table A of the Appen-
dix. We briefly report some of the results. 
We find that large firms (firms with more than 300 employees) use 
advertisement and the employment office as a search channel more fre-
quently. In searching for construction and production workers the em-
ployment office is used more often. Highly educated and more experienc-
ed workers are mostly searched for by advertisements. 
For the choice of search method by employed and unemployed workers 
we refer to Tables C and D of the Appendix. For employed workers we also 
had to estimate a probit equation explaining the decision to search (see 
section 2) . Since the decision to search may be correlated to the decisi-
on to use a specific search channel, we also estimated a bivariate pro-
bit. It appeared that the two processes are uncorrelated. The probit 
equation explaining the decision to search is given in Table B of the 
Appendix. 
Given the predicted probabilities and aggregated data on N^ and V^ 
we can predict N-H and VJJ . In Table 2 we report some of the predicted 
job seekers/vacancy ratios (N../V ) for different types of workers. 
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Table 2 Job seekers/vacancy ratios (N. ,/V. .) for 
different categories i j i j 
Administrative-lower voc. 
advert. informal empl. agency 
11.1 3 . 8 12.1 
Administrative-secondary 7 . 3 3 . 0 13.6 
Administrative-Higher/ac. 5 . 1 3 . 2 7 . 2 
Ccmstruction-lower voc. 2 . 6 1.7 1.7 
From Table 2 we see that there are strong differences in the job see-
kers/vacancy ratios per channel. There are differences between both 
search channels and types of workers. Lower vocational administrative 
workers, for example, experience a job seekers/vacancy ratio of 12.1 
for the employment agency, whereas this ratio equals only 1.7 for lower 
vocational construction workers. The high job seekers/vacancy ratio for 
lower vocational administrative workers using the employment agency, 
contrast also with the relatively small ratio of 3.8 for informal chan-
nels. It appears that for each type of worker the job seekers/vacancy 
ratio of the informal channel is most favourable to job seekers. 
4. Likelihood, empirical specification and results 
4.1 The likelihood and the empirical specification 
Each individual in our sample (employer and worker) can be search-
ing in either of the f our states: advertisement, employment office, 
informal search and other search. In the theoretical model, discussed 
in section 2, we discussed two important factors. The total numbers of 
vacancies and job seekers that use the channel and the efficiency of the 
channel. We specify the efficiency parameter A.. as exp(X.'7j), whereby 
the vector X. describes the job type. 
Denote the waiting time associated with worker's search in a specifie 
search channel j by T. . The waiting time associated with employer's 
search in this specifie recruitment channel is denoted by S.. We assume 
T. and S. to be independently distributed from the waiting times T. and 
S., for every i, i^ j , and furthermore T. ± S.. The hazards correspond-
ing to T. and S. are denoted by 6.s and 0.v. 
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Without duration dependence, the hazards correspond to exponentially 
distributed waiting times T. and S.. Both the employers' and workers' 
data are stock samples implying that in general the duration density 
functions of the sample will be different from the population density 
functions. However, in case of exponentially distributed waiting times 
the elapsed search duration (search duration as measured at the date of 
selection) and the residual duration (search durations beyond the selec-
tion date) are independently and identically exponentially distributed 
(Salant (1977), Ridder (1984)). 
Since elapsed and residual durations of search channels i and j are 
independently distributed, we have that an uncensored observation for 
channel i can be treated as an independently censored observation for 
channel j. The likelihood function factorises neatly into separate parts 
for each of the search channels. Let fj be a generic symbol for the 
density function of the workers' search duration and let gj be a gene-
ric symbol for the density function of the employers' search duration. 
For a worker with elapsed search duration p, using all four channels 
and finding a job through channel 1 af ter t units of time, we write 
simply the following contribution to the likelihood (omitting the index 
i): 
4 
f1(p).f1(t) n { fj(p).(l-Fj(t)) } (9) 
j-2 
The functions Fj(.) are the cumulative distribution functions corres-
ponding to fj ( . ) . And for example for an employer with elapsed search 
duration p, using only channel 1 and finding an employee after t units 
of time we write: 
gl(P)-gl(t) (9') 
The likelihood consists of parts like (9) and (9'). It need to be stres-
sed that for each search channel both sources of information, the em-
ployers' survey and the workers' survey, contribute to the estimation 
of the parameters aj , /3j and 7j . 
Some comments are in order. As can be seen in (8) and (8') the ha-
zards 0jv and 0js have the same set of parameters ai , /3* and -yi. So 
consistent estimates of the parameters can be obtained with either the 
employers' search or workers' search. Combining both sources, as we do, 
is however more efficiënt. 
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A second note concerns the interpretation of the channel: other 
search methods. This is a collection of remaining categories which may 
differ for employers and workers. Combining workers' and employers' 
information may give misleading results in this case. We therefore res-
trict ourselves to presenting the results of the remaining channels. 
The assumption of exponentially distributed durations may be restric-
tive, but convenient. With this assumption no numerical integrations in 
the construction of the likelihood were required, and the likelihood 
remained simple. It is however well known that in the presence of unob-
served heterogeneity a restrictive baseline hazard may seriously bias 
the parameter estimates (Ridder (1987)). In the next subsection we will 
distinguish different markets for unemployed and employed workers, there-
by introducing a large amount of flexibility, that will capture some of 
the unobserved heterogeneity. 
4.2 Unemployed versus employed job seekers 
We specify different matching functions for unemployed and employed job 
seekers. For unemployed job seekers we have 
Fu _ Au N« VP ( 1 0 ) 
For employed job seekers we write: 
Fe _ Ae N<* v0 ( 1 1 ) 
The matching functions for employed and unemployed workers differ in 
their efficiency parameter A and the parameters a and 0. Differences 
in the efficiency parameter A for employed workers and unemployed workers 
may be due to differences in the probability that a contact turns into 
a match (Pc). Unfortunately we cannot identify whether these differen-
ces are due to workers' or employers' decisions. In the specification 
of the efficiency parameter A we will allow for a constant shift (this 
corresponds with the incorporation of a dummy). Differences between au 
and ae (and (3U and /?e) allow for differences in the relative importance 
of N-j and V-j . 
Omitting the index i, we adjust the notation in (6) and (7) as: 
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su 
' j Fju/Nj (12) 
> j S e - FjVNj (13) 
• j V t t - F j « / 7 j (14) 
S SUL SÊ S SU eg 
Note that BA -6 A +6A and 8 A »0j +8A . From the demand side 
of the labour market this means that we deal with a competing risk model, 
i.e. a vacancy can be filled by either an unemployed or an employed 
worker. From the supply side of the market our setup implies competition 
between employed and unemployed job seekers for the same vacancies. For 
each different search/recruitment channel four subhazards are estimated 
SU cp V U "VÊ 
(0j , 6 A , 0i and 8 A ), resulting in the estimation of twelve dif-
ferent subhazards. 
4.3 Results 
Using information on search durations from both workers and employ-
ers, we estimated the a's, /9's and the parameters of A's. Both employers 
and workers have the same efficiency parameter. The efficiency parameter 
depends on occupation variables (with 'managers' as reference group) 
education variables (reference group: primary education) and regional 
variables (the western part of the Netherlands (the economie centre) as 
the reference group). These variables describe the stratification in 
job types. Furthermore X differs in a constant for employed workers and 
unemployed workers. The (geometrie) 'weights' a and /3, indicating the 
relative importance of N and V, are allowed to differ for employed and 
unemployed workers. The results are reported in Table 3. 
Results on the efficiency parameter X 
For the advertisements there are significantly positive effects for 
administrative workers and for virtually all the education variables. 
Significant negative effects are found for vacancies and job seekers in 
the eastern part of the Netherlands and for unemployed workers. Ignoring 
the number of job seekers (N..) and the number of vacancies (V..), unem-j ij ij 
ployed workers have a smaller probability of finding a job than employed 
workers. 
For the informal search channel the small and insignificant coëffi-
ciënt for the unemployment dummy shows that there are no differences in 
15 
the efficiency parameter of employed and unemployed workers. For the 
public employment office the, on average very low, efficiency parameter 
appears to be much higher for unemployed workers. This large positive 
coëfficiënt for unemployed workers may seem strange at first sight. 
However, at least in the Netherlands, the public employment office is 
primarily designed for unemployed job seekers. The sample of employed 
searchers using the employment office as a search tooi may be a negative 
selection of the total sample of employed workers. 
Comparing the efficiency parameters over the search channels we see 
that for unemployed workers advertisements are the least efficiënt, 
whereas the same channel is most efficiënt for employed workers. For 
employed workers the employment office is the least efficiënt search 
channel. 
So far, the results presented are conditional on the number of job 
seekers and the number of vacancies. For the effect of the number of 
job seekers and the number of vacancies on the hazard (or equivalently 
on the flow of filled vacancies) , we have to turn to the estimates of 
the scale parameters a and B. 
Results on the parameters a and B: the relevance of N. . and V. . 
We start with the results for the advertisements. For the flow of 
vacancies filled by unemployed workers (Fu) both the number of job see-
kers and the number of vacancies are of importance, whereas for the flow 
of vacancies filled by employed workers (Fe) only the number of vacancies 
has an effect . Estimation of restricted model versions i.e. oP~ae, ae-au 
and y9e-/3u (see bottom rows of Table 3) show that the restrictions cannot 
be imposed-*. 
An increase in V.. (an economie upswing) increases Fe and Fu. The 
change in Fu is however smaller than the change in Fe (since 8n<Be). 
An increased number of vacancies and an increase in the number of filled 
eg 
vacancies by employed workers leads to an increase in the hazard 9 
4. The parameter a for employed workers attained the lower bound of zero. If we re-
estimate the model with no lower bound, we obtained a very small negative insignificant 
estimate. 
5. The likellhood ratio statistic for the restriction dP-O8 equals 6.4, which exceeds 
the chi-square(l) value (5.0). Imposing the additional restriction P*=8* we see that 
the likelihood value drops another 7 points. Both hypotheses dP-dP, {P^B* as well as oF-oP 
are rejected. 
16 
(the hazard for an employed worker). The relatively small change in Fu 
SUL 
is translated into a relatively small increase in the hazard 6 (the 
hazard for an unemployed worker). Hence increasing V.. is less advanta-
geous for unemployed workers. 
Increasing N.. only affects Fu (since au>ae-0). Increasing N.. will 
definitely decrease the hazards for both employed and unemployed job 
seekers. Since the number of filled vacancies by employed workers (Fe) 
se 
remains constant, the decrease in the hazard $ will be larger than 
su the decrease in the hazard 8 . Hence employed workers are worse of in 
case the number of job seekers increases. A possible explanation might 
be that with a fixed number of vacancies, an increase in N.. is effec-
tively a decrease in the number of offers per searcher. In response to 
this decrease in the 'offer arrival rate', unemployed and employed 
workers' reactions with respect to reservation wage and search intensity 
may differ. 
For the public employment office we see that this phenomena does not 
happen. An increase in the number of job seekers has a stronger negative 
effect for unemployed than for employed workers. However the restrictions 
ae=au and ae-au, /?e=/?u are not rejected (see the bottom rows of Table 
3) . In the restricted model (^—a11 and £e-/Ju) the coëfficiënt a equals 
0.02 whereas /3 equals 0.96. Since a is insignificantly different from 
zero, and fi is insignificantly different from one, we may equally well 
write the matching function as a function of the number of vacancies 
alone. The number of matches is solely determined by the number of va-
cancies in the market (of course conditional on the efficiency parameter 
A). A comparable picture arises for informal search channels. The re-
strictions oe-au and ae-au, /9e-/?u are not rejected and due to the estima-
ted values of a and /? in this restricted model, in the matching function 
only the number of vacancies are of importance. 
For each of the search channels we also tested whether the restricti-
on a+/8-l (constant returns to scale of the matching function) could be 
imposed. As Blanchard and Diamond (1989) argue, 'Active "thick" markets 
may lead to easier matches, with or without more intensive search.' In 
table 3 we report the likelihood values of the restricted model. As in 
Blanchard and Diamond (1989) we cannot reject the hypothesis of constant 
returns to scale. 
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Table 3 Estimation resultsa 
A: Advertisements 
B: Employment offi 
C: Informal search 
ce 
A B C 
Constant -3.33 (17.8) 6.58 ( 6.6) -3.96 (6.0) 
Occupation 
-0.23 ( 1.5) 0.08 ( 0.3) -0.16 ( 0.7) services 
administrative 0.20 ( 2.1) 0.39 ( 2.5) 0.19 ( 1.7) 
production -0.20 ( 2.0) 0.08 ( 0.5) -0.02 ( 0.1) 
construction -0.26 ( 1.2) 0.15 ( 0.6) 0.04 ( 0.2) 
education: 
0.49 ( 3.2) 0.49 ( 2.4) 0.16 ( 0.9) ext. primary 
secondary 0.29 ( 1.8) 0.39 ( 1.6) 0.16 (0.7) 
low vocational 0.42 ( 2.9) 0.42 ( 2.1) 0.10 ( 0.5) 
sec. vocational 0.58 ( 3.7) 0.53 ( 2.1) 0.32 ( 1.5) 
higher/academie 0.27 ( 1.8) 0.33 ( 1.6) -0.17 ( 0.9) 
Rexion 
-0.09 ( 0.5) 0.10 ( 0.5) 0.04 ( 0.2) north 
east -0.31 < 4.3) 0.09 ( 0.7) -0.09 ( 1.0) 
south -0.04 ( 0.5) 0.23 ( 2.2) 0.27 (3.2) 
unemployed -1.96 ( 3.8) 2.73 ( 2.8) -0.17 (0.3) 
a (unemployed) 0.34 ( 3.1) 0.00 0.00 
f3 (unemployed) 0.68* ( 9.2) 0.89 ( 3.1) 0.92 (10.9) 
a (employed) 0.00 - 0.33 ( 4.4) 0.10 ( 0.5) 
f3 (employed) 1.02 (19.8) 1.07 ( 5.5) 0.98 (11.1) 
-log.lik 5774 .48 3007. 39 5003.96 
-log. likelihood values 
Restricted model v« irsions A B C 
c^-i , aP+0*-i 5774 .59 3009 24 5004.38 
cP-c? 5777 .70 3007 73 5004.14 
Q"-Q», F-fP 5784 .60 3009 46 5004.41 
a: absolute t-values in parentheses 
*: significantly different from 1 
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Testing for differences in the matching process of ewployed and unemploy-
ed workers 
The results obtained so far indicate marked differences between 
employed and unemployed workers. In order to see whether these differen-
ces also hold statistically, we have to test the 'single-risk' model 
(the model where no distinction is made between employed and unemployed 
workers, equations (6)-(8b)) against the augmented model (equations (10)-
(15)). We consider two alternative procedures to test for differences 
between employed and unemployed workers in the augmented model. 
A first route is to derive a modified likelihood ratio test. The 
test appears to be similar to the one proposed by Narendranathan and 
Stewart (1991) or Lindeboom and Theeuwes (1991). In this specific case 
however the test depends on all the individual observations in the sam-
ple, which makes it a litle more difficult to perform. 
A second yet very simple testing procedure is based on a conditional 
argument. One may test whether in the restricted augmented model, ae-au 
and /9e"-/?u, the (single) dummy variable for unemployed is significantly 
different from zero. Next conditional on significance of this coëffi-
ciënt, in the setting of a nested model, differences between a and /9 
can be tested. Note that this procedure gives a sufficiënt condition 
for differences between employed and unemployed workers. Differences 
between employed workers and unemployed workers are not ruled out by an 
insignificant coëfficiënt for the dummy variable in the augmented mo-
del. 
We only performed the second, conditional test. The test indicates 
that for each search channel a distinction between employed and unemploy-
ed workers is meaningful . 
In the discussion of the results, we separately examined the influen-
ce of the parameters contained in A, and a and p. Assessing the effect-
iveness of the different search channels requires a joint examination 
6. According to the second procedure we have the following results (t-values in paren-
theses) : 
dummy unemployed 
Advertlsements -1.02 (10.2) 
Employment Off. 1.02 ( 2.7) 
Informal search -0.47 ( 3.0) 
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of the effects of A, a and 0. To this end we will perform a small simu-
lation analysis which will give us more insight in the effectiveness of 
different search channels. 
4.3 Simulations 
Table 4 below illustrates the estimation results of Table 3. The 
top part of the Table reports the probability that a worker finds a new 
job within six months, whereas in the bottom part of Table 4 the proba-
bility that an employer finds a new worker within three months is report-
ed. We calculated these probabilities for different types of labour, each 
categorized by employed and unemployed job seekers. 
The differences for employed and unemployed job seekers are sub-
stantial. A first glance at the top part of the Table reveals that neit-
her for employed workers nor for unemployed workers a specific search 
channel could be pointed out as being the best. For employed job seekers 
advertising or informal search may be very effective whereas the use of 
employment offices may be very ineffective. The probability for an em-
ployed administrative worker with a secondary education using advertise-
ments as a search channel is approximately 7 times larger than the proba-
bility if the employment office is used (15.5 percent versus 2.1 per-
cent) . For employed higher/academic administrative workers the odds are 
even more favorable (13.6 percent versus 0.9 percent). The supply (N..) 
and demand (V..) ratio for the employment office are very unfavourable 
resulting in an extreme low success probability of only 0.9 percent for 
employed administrative/higher/academic workers. Although it may be clear 
that the employment office is the least effective for employed workers, 
it is not apparent which of the remaining search channels is the most 
effective. This is a consequence of differences in the N.. and V . ratio 
over different types of labour, resulting in an unclear overall (rariking) 
picture. 
For unemployed workers an almost opposite picture emerges. Adverti-
sement is definitely the least effective search channel for unemployed 
workers. For almost all categories informal search is the most effective 
for unemployed workers. The efficiency parameter of the public employment 
office and of the informal search is approximately the same for unemploy-
ed workers, but since employers use the informal search channel more 
of ten than the employment office (relatively large V..), more matches 
result. 
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Table 4 Success probabilities' 
Job seekers: probability to find a new job within 
six months 
Administrative/low vocational 
employed worker 
unemployed worker 
Administrative/secondary 
employed worker 
unemployed worker 
Administrative/Higher/Academie 
employed worker 
unemployed worker 
Construction/low vocational 
employed worker 
unemployed worker 
Adver Empl Infor 
tising office mal 
10.3 1.8 16.4 
3.9 6.9 12.0 
15.5 2.1 16.5 
4.9 9.6 12.8 
13.6 0.9 10.9 
4.5 5.3 7.3 
23.5 9.5 30.6 
6.0 28.4 21.6 
Vacancies: probability for an employer to find 
a new worker within three months 
Administrative/low vocational 
employed worker is hired 
unemployed worker is hired 
Administrative/secondary 
employed worker is hired 
unemployed worker is hired 
Administrative/Higher/Academie 
employed worker is hired 
unemployed worker is hired 
Construction/low vocational 
employed worker is hired 
unemployed worker is hired 
Adver Empl Infor 
tising office mal 
58.6 13.2 35.4 
27.5 43.3 26.9 
54.0 11.0 36.2 
20.8 42.7 29.0 
53.9 8.9 29.6 
21.6 44.2 20.7 
43.3 10.6 31.2 
12.3 31.1 22.0 
a: vacancy and job seekar are located in the western part of 
the Netherlands 
The relative success of the employment office in matching unemployed 
workers and vacancies as compared to employed job seekers and vacancies 
can be explained by two f acts. First, from Table C in the appendix it 
can be seen that the probability that an employed workers uses the em-
ployment office is small (see also Table A for the probability that an 
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unemployed worker uses the employment office). Hence, the competition 
between the job seekers searching through this specific search channel, 
is primarily among unemployed workers. For the other search channels 
employed workers compete more prominently for the same type of job. 
Secondly, given the number of job seekers and the number of vacancies, 
employed workers using the employment office may become stigmatised. 
Averaged over the search channels, we see that employed workers have 
a higher probability of success than unemployed workers. 
The lower half of Table 4 concerns the success probabilities of em-
ployers looking for a new worker. The employers' success probabilities 
are on average much higher than those for job seekers. This is clearly 
a result of the relatively small number of vacancies (as compared to 
the number of job seekers). Consequently vacancy durations will on ave-
rage be much shorter than search durations of employed or unemployed 
workers. As expected, averaged over the different recruitment channels 
the probability that an employed worker is hired is higher than the 
probability that an unemployed worker is hired. Furthermore, the hiring 
of an employed worker is most effective using advertisements or informal 
search. Again, the employment office is very effective in matching un-
employed workers and vacancies. It is very ineffective for employed 
workers. 
5. Comments on the estimation procedure 
Estimation of the theoretical model (see section 2, equation (3)) 
required data on the flow of filled vacancies, the number of job see-
kers and the number of vacancies, each stratified according to the type 
of job as well as to search channel use. Since market data stratified 
according to search channel use are not available, we had to use esti-
mated values in the empirical model (equations (4), (5), (8) and (8')). 
True values of N.. and V,. are replaced by estimated values p. .N. and 
ij ij J *ij i 
q..V.. To see the consequences of this we write for one of our hazard 
specifications (omitting the indices): 
0s(X;a,0,7)-exp[ X'7+(a-l)log(ft)+01og(tf)+(<*-l) Uog(N) -log(ft) } + 
0{log(V)-log(v)} ] 
-exp[ X'7+(a-l)log(ft)+/31og(v) ].«i°"1.e2^ 
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For the hazard of a vacancy we have an analogous expression with 
also the error terms e^ and e£ arise. As a result unobserved heteroge-
neity is introduced. Because of the specific form of the unobserved hete-
rogeneity, 0V and 6S will be correlated over the search channels. More-
over, since p. . is the product of two marginal probabilities a common 
error term is introduced into each of the hazards. As a consequence all 
hazards may be correlated. 
It is well known that ignoring unobserved heterogeneity in duration 
models may lead to biased parameter estimates (see for example Lancas-
ter and Nickel (1980)). A way to solve this problem is to specify for 
each search channel a distributions for e^ and C2> anc* integrate these 
(correlated) terms out of the total likelihood. Estimation of the likeli-
hood function will become rather cumbersome since it does not factorize 
and, in general, no closed form analytical expressions of the likelihood 
contributions will exist. 
Instead of actually solving the problem of unobserved heterogenei-
ty, one can also examine to what extent the obtained estimation results 
are sensitive to 'random' variations in the predictions of N and V. We 
therefore performed a very simple sensitivity analysis. We generate the 
error terms ei and t^ and reestimate the likelihood function for each 
drawing of e\ and &2- ^ e used 10 different drawings. The results on these 
drawings are reported in Table E in the appendix. The parameters esti-
mates appear to quite be robust. 
6. Conclusions 
This paper's main objective is to analyse the effectiveness of dif-
ferent search or recruitment channels used by workers and employers. 
in the empirical analyses we distinguish three different search or re-
cruitment channels: advertisements, the employment office and informal 
search. Our approach to assess the effectiveness of the different search 
or recruitment channels differs from that in the literature. For each 
search/recruitment channel we specify a Cobb-Douglas matching function. 
The number of matches per channel depends on the number of vacancies 
and the number of job seekers coming through that channel. The parameters 
of the matching function consist of scale parameters (or 'geometrie 
weights') a and $ indicating the relative importance of N and V, and an 
efficiency parameter A. The efficiency parameter indlcates the speed at 
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which, conditional on the number of workers and vacancies, a contact 
between an employer and a worker is translated into a match. Apart form 
the usual parameterisation we explicitly allow the parameters a, B and 
A to differ for employed and unemployed workers. 
From the matching functions defined at the market level, we derive 
micro economie duration models for employers and workers. In the speci-
fication of the hazard, the same parameters a,8 and A appear. We estimate 
the model, using both micro economie data from an employers' survey and 
a workers' survey and data at the market level. 
The results indicate clear differences between the effectiveness of 
the different search channels. This is caused not only by differences 
in efficiency (A), but also by differences in the supply (N) demand (V) 
ratio. Within a specific search channel large differences exist between 
employed workers and unemployed workers. The large differences are a 
result of the compound effect of differences in the parameters A, a and 
B. Averaged over the search/recruitment channels we see that employed 
workers have higher probability of success than unemployed workers. 
Advertisements and informal search channels are very effective in mat-
ching employed workers and vacancies. The employment office and informal 
search are very effective in matching unemployed workers and vacancies. 
24 
Appendix 
Definition of the variables 
A. OSA job vacancy survey and OSA labour force panel survey 
Occupation: 
Services : Services (nurses included) 
Administrative: Administrative workers 
Production : Production workers (metal, electrotechnical, others) 
Construction : Construction workers 
Manegerial workers, policy makers, scientific: reference group 
Education: 
Primary (reference group) 
Extended primary 
Secondary 
Low vocational 
Secondary vocational 
Higher or academie 
Region: 
North: District Groningen, Friesland, Drenthe 
East : District Overijssel, Gelderland, Flevoland 
South: District Noord-Brabant, limburg 
West : Reference group (Economie centre of The Netherlands) 
District Utrecht, Noord-Holland, Zuid-Holland 
B. Additional variables in the OSA job vacancy survey (see Table A) 
Firm size: 
10 - 50 employees (reference group) 
50 -100 employees 
100-200 employees 
200-300 employees 
>300 employees 
Work experience required: 
0-1 year (reference group) 
1-3 years 
>3 years 
Single vacancy: Dummy variable which equals one if only one employee is 
needed, (reference group: multiple employees are needed) 
Additional variables in the OSA labour force panel survey 
(see Tables B,C, D) 
Age 
Gender 
Experience 
# unempl betw, '80-'85 
Part-time job 
Strenuous work 
Irregular work 
Tempory work 
Civilian Worker 
Satisfied with wage 
Age in years 
Dummy 1 if female 
Number of years on the labour market 
Number of unemployment spells in years 80-'85 
Dummy 1 if number of hours workerd <33 
Dummy 1 for strenuous work (subjective) 
Dummy 1 for irregular work (subjective) 
Dummy 1 for provisional or temporary work 
Dummy 1 for civilian workers 
Dummy 1 if respondent is satisfied with wage 
(subjective) 
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TabIe A The use of search methods by employers 
Advert is ement Informe 1 Empl. office Others 
Constant 
Size of firm 
-0.06 
0.31 
0.26 
0.23 
0.32 
0.36 
-0.06 
0.11 
-0.30 
-0.19 
0.09 
-0.16 
0.28 
0.40 
-0.20 
0.17 
0.16 
0.16 
0.30 
-0.22 
( 
< 
( 
( 
( 
( 
( 
( 
( 
( 
< 
( 
( 
( 
( 
( 
( 
( 
( 
( 
0.2) 
2.3) 
2.2) 
1.6) 
2.8) 
2.0) 
0.5) 
0.7) 
1.0) 
0.9) 
0.4) 
0.9) 
1.5) 
1.9) 
1.1) 
1.4) 
1.6) 
1.7) 
2.7) 
2.4) 
1.00 
-0.23 
-0.15 
-0.05 
-0.53 
0.05 
-0.01 
-0.08 
-0.12 
-0.41 
-0.26 
0.06 
-0.10 
-0.32 
-0.16 
0.10 
-0.00 
0.12 
0.21 
-0.49 
( 
( 
( 
( 
( 
( 
C 
( 
( 
( 
( 
( 
( 
( 
( 
( 
( 
( 
( 
( 
4.4) 
1.7) 
1.2) 
0.3) 
4.5) 
0.2) 
0.1) 
0.5) 
0.3) 
1.9) 
1.2) 
0.3) 
0.5) 
1.5) 
0.8) 
0.8) 
0.0) 
1.2) 
1.9) 
5.2) 
-0.55 
-0.03 
0.12 
-0.08 
0.49 
0.34 
0.23 
0.53 
1.10 
0.17 
0.21 
0.41 
0.08 
0.17 
0.72 
-0.17 
-0.04 
0.06 
-0.25 
-0.31 
( 2.4) 
( -.2) 
( 1.0) 
( 0.5) 
( 4.2) 
( 2.0) 
( 1.9) 
( 4.0) 
( 3.4) 
( 0.8) 
( 0.9) 
( 2.3) 
( 0.4) 
( 0.8) 
( 3.9) 
( 1.4) 
( 0.4) 
( 0.6) 
( 2.3) 
( 3.4) 
0.13 ( 0.5) 
-0.04 ( 0.3) 
0.05 ( 0.3) 
-0.06 ( 0.4) 
-0.35 ( 3.0) 
-0.01 ( 0.0) 
-0.09 ( 0.7) 
-0.19 ( 1.3) 
-1.10 ( 3.2) 
0.36 ( 1.7) 
-0.31 ( 1.4) 
0.31 ( 1.7) 
-0.03 ( 0.1) 
-0.11 ( 0.5) 
-0.34 ( 1.7) 
-0.12 ( 1.0) 
-0.06 ( 0.5) 
-0.20 ( 2.0) 
-0.21 ( 1.9) 
-0.28 ( 3.1) 
50-100 
100-200 
200-300 
>300 
Occupation 
Services 
Administrative 
Froduction 
Construction 
Education 
Ext. primary 
Secondary 
Low vocational 
Secondary voc. 
Higher/academie 
Region 
North 
East 
South 
Exoerience (vears) 
1-3 
>3 
Single vacancy 
absolute t-values in parentheses 
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TabIe B The search decision by employed workers 
Constant 0.59 ( 0.9) 
Age (log) -0.34 ( 1.6) 
Gender -0.19 ( 2.2) 
Education 
0.11 ( 0.8) Ext. primary 
Secondary -0.07 ( 0.3) 
Low voc. 0.10 ( 0.8) 
Secondary voc. 0.10 ( 0.7) 
Higher/ac. 0.21 ( 2.1) 
Resion 
-0.03 ( 0.2) North 
East -0.15 ( 1.6) 
South -0.15 ( 1.8) 
Experience -0.29 ( 4.1) 
# unempl betw. '80-'85 0.06 ( 1.0) 
part-time job -0.13 ( 1.2) 
strenuous work -0.65 ( 0.8) 
irregular work -0.14 ( 1.5) 
temporary work 0.62 ( 5.5) 
civilian worker -0.06 ( 0.9) 
satisfied with wage -0.42 ( 5.9) 
absolute t-values in parentheses 
Tab Ie C The use of search methods by employed workers 
Advertisement Informal Empl. office Others 
Constant 
Age (log) 
Gender 
Education 
0.43 ( 0.2) 1.59 ( 0.9) -2.71 ( 1.4) -2.78 ( 1.8) 
0.47 ( 0.8) -0.79 ( 1.5) 0.06 ( 0.1) 0.79 ( 1.6) 
0.02 ( 0.1) -0.20 ( 1.1) 0.38 ( 1.7) -0.03 ( 0.2) 
-1.06 ( 2.0) 0.04 ( 0.1) 0.71 ( 1.3) -0.04 ( 0.1) 
3.99 ( 0.0) 0.30 ( 0.6) 1.46 ( 2.2) -0.29 ( 0.6) 
-0.83 ( 1.7) 0.07 ( 0.2) 1.04 ( 2.0) 0.10 ( 0.3) 
-0.77 ( 1.6) 0.03 ( 0.1) 0.65 ( 1.2) 0.10 ( 0.3) 
-0.63 ( 1.2) 0.40 ( 1.2) 0.14 ( 0.3) -0.32 ( 1.0) 
0.02 ( 0.1) -0.14 ( 0.6) 0.78 ( 1.6) -0.25 ( 1.0) 
0.07 ( 0.2) -0.02 ( 0.1) 0.55 ( 1.1) -0.04 ( 0.2) 
-0.11 ( 0.4) 0.10 ( 0.4) 0.45 ( 0.9) -0.09 ( 0.4) 
-0.51 ( 0.9) 1.14 ( 2.2) 0.87 ( 1.3) -0.98 ( 1.6) 
0.53 ( 1.5) -0.23 ( 0.9) 0.35 ( 1.3) -0.59 ( 2.2) 
0.43 ( 1.6) 0.30 ( 1.4) -0.21 ( 0.7) -0.16 ( 0.7) 
0.04 ( 0.2) -0.04 ( 0.2) 0.02 ( 0.1) -0.01 ( 0.0) 
-0.31 ( 1.4) 0.37 ( 2.0) 0.13 ( 0.6) -0.05 ( 0.3) 
Ext. primary 
Secondary 
Low voc. 
Secondary voc. 
Higher/ac. 
Occuiiation 
Services 
Administrative 
Froduction 
Construction 
Region 
North 
East 
South 
Experience 
absolute t-values in parentheses 
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Table D The use of search methods by unemployed workers 
Advertisement Informal Empl. office Other 
Constant 0.59 ( 0.4) 1.80 ( 1.2) 3.15 ( 2.1) -2.05 ( 1.3) 
Age (years) -0.07 ( 0.1) -0.63 ( 1.4) -1.00 ( 2.2) 0.56 ( 1.2) 
Gender 0.08 ( 0.3) -0.15 ( 0.7) -0.13 ( 0.6) 0.06 ( 0.3) 
Education 
0.28 ( 0.7) -0.06 ( 0.2) -0.07 ( 0.2) 0.22 ( 0.6) Ext. primary 
Secondary -0.10 ( 0.2) 0.06 ( 0.1) 0.55 ( 1.0) 0.02 ( 0.0) 
Low voc. -0.14 ( 0.4) -0.34 ( 1.1) -0.42 ( 1.3) 0.64 ( 1.8) 
Secondary voc 0.22 ( 0.6) -0.21 ( 0. 6) -0.43 ( 1.2) 0.06 ( 0.2) 
Higher/ac. 0.17 ( 0.4) 0.04 ( 0.1) -0.72 ( 2.0) 0.19 ( 0.5) 
Occuwation 
0.01 ( 0.0) 0.17 ( 0.5) 0.05 ( 0.1) -0.27 ( 0.7) Services 
Administrativ 9 0.07 ( 0.1) 0.35 ( 0.8) -0.24 ( 0.5) -0.28 ( 0.6) 
Froduction 0.14 ( 0.3) 0.07 ( 0.2) -0.09 ( 0.2) -0.33 ( 0.8) 
Construction -0.04 ( 0.0) 0.43 ( 0.5) -0.01 ( 0.0) -
Regiem 
0.51 ( 1.6) 0.13 ( 0.5) 0.34 ( 1.2) -0.62 ( 2.0) North 
East 0.52 ( 1.9) 0.44 ( 1.9). 0.48 ( 2.0) -0.72 ( 2.8) 
South 0.10 ( 0.4) 0.61 < 2.5) 0.83 ( 3.2) -0.40 ( 1.5) 
Experience 0.33 < 0.2) 0.12 ( 0.7) 0.33 ( 1.9) -0.11 ( 0.6) 
absolute t-values in parentheses 
Table E Some results on the sensitlvity of the parameter estimates£ 
dummy o" F O9 0" 
Advertisement 
unemployed 
-1.02 0.26 0.71 0.12 1.02 
(0.27) (0.04) (0.13) (0.04) (0.02) 
Employmant Off. 2.70 0.01 1.08 0.34 0.88 
(0.17) (0.00) (0.02) (0.03) (0.01) 
Informal search 0.24 0.01 0.90 0.14 0.97 
(0.09) (0.00) (0.01) (0.02) (0.01) 
a: Standard errors in parentheses 
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